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Abstract
In this paper, we extend the theory of abstract argumentation systems proposed by Vreeswijk
(1997). This framework stands at a high abstraction level and provides a general model for argumen-
tation activity. However, the theory reveals an inherent limitation in that the premises of the argumen-
tation process are assumed to be indefeasible, and this introduces the need of an implicit constraint on
the strength of the arguments, in order to preserve correctness. In many application contexts the infor-
mation available to start reasoning is not guaranteed to be completely reliable, therefore it is natural
to assume that premises can be discarded during the argumentation process. We extend the theory by
admitting that premises can be defeated and relaxing the implicit assumption about their strength.
Besides fixing the technical problems related to this hidden assumption (e.g., ensuring that
warranted arguments are compatible), our proposal provides an integrated model for belief revision
and defeasible reasoning, confirming the suitability of argumentation as a general model for the
activity of intelligent reasoning in presence of various kinds of uncertainty. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Argumentation is the process of constructing arguments for propositions. An argument
is a representation of a sequence of inferences leading to a conclusion: while in standard
logic an argument represents a definite proof, in defeasible reasoning an argument may
represent just a provisional reason for believing a proposition, since it does not provide a
proof, but only a plausible support for its conclusion that, however, needs not to be certain.
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Furthermore, different arguments may support contradictory conclusions. In such a
framework, the core problem is to determine which conclusions should be believed in
presence of conflicting arguments. To this purpose it is necessary to define an order
among arguments, reflecting their relative strength or conclusive force. This order plays
an important role in determining the relation of defeat among arguments and in identifying
the most credible conclusions.
Several argumentation systems have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [3–7,9,12]),
but as pointed out by Vreeswijk [21] many of them have their own problems, such as
the production of fallacious arguments that defeat lines of reasoning in [14–17], or the
generation of cycles of arguments in which each argument defeats its successor in [11].
A major shortcoming of almost all systems analyzed by Vreeswijk is an over-specification
of the notion of defeat, based only on syntactical rules. Actually, it is always possible to
construct, for a given situation described at the syntactic level, different interpretations
at the semantic level in such a way that the same undefeated argument is correct in one
interpretation but wrong in another. In order to avoid these drawbacks, Vreeswijk attempts
to find out those principles which are valid whatever notion of defeat is assumed, and
develops a theory which does not prescribe any particular notion of conclusive force.
In particular, his theory of abstract argumentation systems does not assume any specific
criterion for ordering arguments; only three conditions of general validity which constrain
the order of conclusive force of the arguments are assumed. These conditions are claimed to
be sufficiently general to ensure that no specific distribution of conclusive force, expressing
the semantics of a particular application domain of interest, is excluded.
We agree with Vreeswijk that it is essential to distinguish between the matter of
establishing an order among arguments and the general properties of arguments that do not
depend on any specific ordering criterion. Actually it is not possible to specify an ordering
relation among arguments only on the basis of their syntactic structure: their meaning in
the considered application context should be taken into account.
For example, for a physical agent such as a robot the premises on which arguments
are based might be partitioned in two classes, on the basis of the information source they
come from: some premises might be associated with sensorial data, while others could
represent pre-acquired knowledge about the domain (such as a map for a navigation task).
As a consequence, in the former case the strength of each premise will be related to the
reliability of the relevant sensor, while in the latter case it will indicate the degree of
credibility of the relevant knowledge. A set of premises constitutes the starting point for
the subsequent inferential steps an agent can carry out using rules. Some of the rules are
completely sure and lead to certain conclusions as far as the premises are correct. For
instance, if the robot believes that there is a brick wall in front of it (either by perception or
by the indication of a map), it will argue that it cannot proceed forward: in this case, given
the premise, the conclusion is surely true. Other rules, however, are defeasible and do
not lead to definitely certain conclusions even in presence of correct premises. For instance
from the premise that there is a corridor in the map, it can be argued that a given destination
is reachable through it. However, even if the premise is correct, such a conclusion is not
certain: the robot might meet an obstacle on its way and then it might be unable to proceed.
In presence of defeasible rules, the whole information set managed by an agent may
be inconsistent: it is required that the reasoning system of the agent is able to handle
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contradictions without loosing its deductive power, but rather discovering those arguments
that emerge undefeated from the conflicts. Vreeswijk’s theory is well suited as a theoretical
foundation for this kind of problems. As pointed out in [2,8], while standing at a high
abstraction level and leaving out any question about the order among arguments, it
provides several important results concerning the management of a possibly inconsistent
knowledge-base in a defeasible reasoning context. Among the key concepts of the theory,
the notion of extension identifies the set of all those arguments that emerge undefeated as
the result of an argumentation process based on a given set of premises and a given set of
rules of inference. The conclusions of such arguments can then be warranted, and in case
the agent is an ideal reasoner, these are the facts it will believe at the end of the reasoning
process and on which it will base its action.
An analysis of Vreeswijk’s theory shows however that in its framework premises have a
sort of preferential treatment among arguments, since it is explicitly stated that they always
emerge undefeated from the argumentation process.
This position is not completely satisfactory for two reasons:
• it limits the general applicability of the theory, since there are practical application
contexts where it is reasonable to assume that premises can be defeated;
• it introduces the need of an implicit assumption, concerning the strength of the
premises, in order to preserve the correctness of the theory.
This paper aims at extending Vreeswijk’s theory by admitting that premises can be
defeated. This corresponds to relaxing the implicit assumption about the strength of
the premises, so extending the applicability of the framework while preserving its most
important results.
The paper is organized as follows. After recalling the basic concepts of abstract
argumentation systems theory in Section 2, we analyze in Section 3 the role played
by premises and point out in Section 4 the implicit assumption underlying the theory.
The extended theory we propose is introduced in Section 5 and presented in detail in
Section 6. Finally a discussion about related works and some conclusions are provided
in Section 7.
2. Basic concepts
In order to make our paper self-contained, we review in this section the core concepts of
Vreeswijk’s theory.
An abstract argumentation system is defined as a triple
A= (L,R,6)
where L is a language (i.e., a set containing a distinguished element ⊥), R is a set of rules
of inference and 6 is a reflexive and transitive partial order on arguments.
There are two classes of rules of inference:
(1) strict rules of inference, of the form φ1, . . . , φn→ φ,
(2) defeasible rules of inference, of the form φ1, . . . , φn⇒ φ,
where φ1, . . . , φn is a finite sequence in L and φ is an element of L.
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Arguments are defined as chains of rules organized as trees. More precisely, an argument
σ is
(1) a member of L (atomic argument); or
(2) a formula of the form σ1, . . . , σn → φ, where σ1, . . . , σn is a finite sequence of
arguments with conclusions φ1, . . . , φn corresponding to the rule φ1, . . . , φn→ φ in
R and φ does not appear in any argument of the sequence σ1, . . . , σn; or
(3) a formula of the form σ1, . . . , σn ⇒ φ with the same restrictions as in (2) (with
obvious adjustments).
Premises, conclusions and subarguments are defined in the usual way. The set of
premises of an argument σ is denoted by prem(σ ). In the same way, given a set of
arguments Σ , the set of the premises of the arguments in Σ is denoted by prem(Σ).
The notation σ1, . . . , σn → σ is used to denote the argument σ constructed from the
subarguments σ1, . . . , σn using the rule of inference φ1, . . . , φn→ φ, where φ1, . . . , φn and
φ are the conclusions of the corresponding arguments. An argument σ is strict if σ ∈L or
σ1, . . . , σn→ σ where σ1, . . . , σn are strict arguments. An argument is defeasible if it is
not strict.
Arguments are assumed to be associated with a strength, also called conclusive force,
on which no hypotheses are made except that arguments are partially ordered: an argument
σ is weaker than another argument τ if σ precedes τ in the order, i.e., σ < τ . Three
conditions are assumed on the order of conclusive force among arguments (Definition 2.12
of [21]):
(1) The first condition ensures that defeat is a finite process, stating that infinite chains
of arguments of the kind σ1 < σ2 < · · ·< σn < · · · are not allowed.
(2) The second condition states that any argument cannot be strictly stronger than any
of its subarguments.
(3) The third condition states that strict inference rules are conservative with respect to
conclusive force, that is: if σ1, . . . , σn→ σ , then σi 6 σ for some 16 i 6 n.
Note that the third condition assigns a special role to strict inference rules; while in
general the simple argument p⇒ a may be weaker than its premise p, in the case of a
strict rule p→ a the conclusive force of p is preserved, and we can think that the argument
which has a as its conclusion inherits the strength of the premise.
Strict rules play also a main role in the definition of compatibility: a subset P of L is
incompatible if there exists a strict argument in contradiction (i.e., having⊥ as conclusion)
based on P (i.e., having all its premises in P ). A subset of L is compatible if it is not
incompatible. The concept of compatibility is then extended to sets of arguments, by
considering the compatibility of the set of their conclusions.
3. The role of premises
All arguments in Vreeswijk’s theory are based on a finite set of premises, called base
set, which is defined as a finite compatible subset of L. This base set is asserted to be
“the point of departure in forward argumentation, and the final stopping place in backward
justification”, as it contains the basic irreducible information from which it is possible
to derive arguments that are in force and conclusions that are warranted. The base set
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must feature an internal coherence which ensures it can be used to deduce a nontrivial
set of conclusions: in particular, compatibility is required to avoid conflicts between strict
arguments, and to ensure that premises are present in all its extensions (see below for a
definition of this notion).
To be more precise, we need to introduce the concept of defeat. A set of arguments Σ
is a defeater of an argument σ if it is incompatible with this argument and there are not
arguments in Σ strictly weaker than σ .
Then the notion of enablement is defined. Informally, an argument σ is enabled by a set
of arguments Σ if and only if all its subarguments, including σ itself, are not defeated by
subsets of Σ . More formally:
Definition 1 (Definition 4.4 of [21]). Let P be a base set, and let Σ be a set of arguments.
An argument σ is enabled by Σ on the basis of P , written P |Σ∼ σ , if:
(1) σ ∈ P ; or
(2) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have P |Σ∼ σ1, . . . , σn and σ1, . . . , σn→ σ ; or
(3) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have P |Σ∼ σ1, . . . , σn and σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ and
Σ does not contain defeaters of σ .
Note that clause (1) ensures that every premise is enabled, so that the entire base set P
is conserved in the set of arguments enabled by Σ independently of any condition; in a
sense, premises seem to obtain a preferential treatment. 3
The central concept of Vreeswijk’s theory is the notion of warrant. Informally, starting
from a set of premises P , we are interested in what are the acceptable arguments and their
conclusions, which are called the elements warranted on the basis of P . To this aim, a
defeasible entailment relation between a base set P and arguments based on P is defined
as follows:
Definition 2 (Definition 4.17 of [21]). Let P be a base set. A relation |∼ between P and
arguments based on P is a defeasible entailment relation if, for every argument σ based on
P , we have P |∼ σ (i.e., σ is in force on the basis of P ) if and only if
(1) σ ∈ P ; or
(2) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have P |∼ σ1, . . . , σn and σ1, . . . , σn→ σ ; or
(3) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have P |∼ σ1, . . . , σn and σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ and
every set of argumentsΣ that is in force on the basis of P is not a defeater of σ .
A set of argumentsΣ is an extension of P if there exists a defeasible entailment relation
|∼ such that Σ = {σ | P |∼ σ }. An extension is therefore made up of those arguments that
emerge undefeated from all the arguments that can be constructed on the basis of P . Since
there can be incompatible arguments having the same force or not comparable, there are
is general more than one extensions of a given base set. In other words, there are different
scenarios entailed by a set of premises, the choice among them being arbitrary. In every
3 The same preferential treatment is given to premises in the definition of inductive warrant (see Definition 4.11
in [21]), which guarantees P to be in force at all levels.
256 P. Baroni et al. / Artificial Intelligence 120 (2000) 251–270
one of these scenarios, all the premises are maintained, as ensured by the first clause of
Definition 2.
The brief summary of concepts presented above gives an idea of the role played
by premises in Vreeswijk’s theory: they are certain facts, assumptions on which every
argumentation can rely, because they are never retreated. Therefore, the premises must
be compatible, as stated by the definition of base set, and they have to appear in every
extension, as entailed by the previous definitions.
This role ascribed to premises is well-suited in those domains where initial information
is definitely reliable, so that premises are always coherent and completely certain.
However, in many real-world applications the information available to start reasoning
is not guaranteed to be completely reliable. As an example, let us consider again the
aforementioned case of a physical agent. In general a robot is equipped with several sensors
and none of them can be supposed to be foolproof. For this reason sensor capabilities,
though somewhat complementary, are usually redundant: measurements coming from
different sensors may concern the same physical quantity and need to be combined to
gain more information. Moreover, even in static conditions, it is useful to add a further
level of redundancy by acquiring multiple repeated measurements from each sensor. Each
individual sensorial acquisition may be regarded as a premise, whose strength depends on
the intrinsic reliability of the relevant sensor and also on the environmental conditions (in
general not completely known) at the time the measurement is taken. As a consequence,
premises may have different strengths and it may well be the case that a premise is in
conflict with conclusions supported by stronger premises, so that it has to be discarded.
A similar situation may arise, for example, when a premise based on the pre-acquired agent
knowledge is in conflict with the conclusions derived from sensor readings: if the sensors
are sufficiently reliable, the agent might prefer the conclusions supported by sensory data
to the premise based on pre-acquired knowledge.
This example shows that there are application contexts where it is natural to assume
that premises can be discarded during the argumentation process; but this is not allowed in
Vreeswijk’s theory. Therefore, it might be interesting to extend the theory in this direction.
4. An implicit assumption
The situation outlined in the previous section derives from an implicit assumption about
the order of arguments underlying Vreeswijk’s theory. Although not stated explicitly,
the theory tacitly assumes that the premises in a base set P are somehow stronger than
defeasible arguments. If we remove this assumption a fundamental statement of the theory
turns out to be false, i.e., it is no more guaranteed that a generic extension Σ of a base set
P is compatible.
To show this, let us examine how this statement is proved in [21] (Proposition 5.11).
The proof is ‘ab absurdo’, i.e., first of all it is assumed that Σ is incompatible. By the
definition of incompatibility, a finite incompatible subset of Σ , say ΣS , exists. Then it is
claimed that the elements of ΣS can be assumed, without loss of generality, as having the
form σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ . Let us notice that the claim states that two kinds of arguments can
be neglected:
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(1) arguments of the form σ1, . . . , σn→ σ ,
(2) atomic arguments, i.e., premises belonging to P .
By Proposition 3.5 of [21], ΣS has a 6-least element σ , so ΣS \ {σ } is a defeater of σ
that is in force. If the argument σ is of the form σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ , then according to the third
clause of Definition 2 it should not be in force, this fact being impossible because σ ∈Σ .
This concludes the proof according to [21].
However, while exclusion (1) mentioned above is correct, because if an argument of the
form σ1, . . . , σn→ σ belongs to ΣS it is possible to consider, without loss of generality,
the incompatible set (ΣS \ σ) ∪ {σ1, . . . , σn} instead of ΣS , the same is not true for
exclusion (2). There are no reasons to exclude that an atomic argument belongs to ΣS .
If no conditions on the strength of the premises are assumed, nothing prevents the
6-least element of ΣS to be an atomic argument. In this case, σ would be an argument
of P defeated by ΣS \ {σ }, but, according to the first clause of Definition 2, it would be in
force, and we would not get a contradiction. Therefore the proof provided in [21] is correct
only if there is some guarantee that no 6-least element of ΣS belongs to P .
As an example of an extension which is not compatible, consider the abstract
argumentation system A with language L= {p1,p2, a} ∪ {⊥}, with rules
R = {p2⇒ a} ∪ {p1, a→⊥}
and with an order on arguments6 such that 4
p1 <p2⇒ a < p2.
Let P = {p1,p2}, and let us prove that the set Σ = {p1,p2,p2⇒ a} is an extension of P .
As assured by the first clause of Definition 2, the atomic arguments p1 and p2 are in force.
According to the same definition, the argument p2⇒ a is in force if
(1) P |∼ p2, and
(2) the rule p2⇒ a is in R, and
(3) every set of argumentsΣ that is in force is not a defeater of p2⇒ a.
Conditions (1) and (2) are clearly fulfilled. As the only set of argumentsΣ incompatible
with p2⇒ a is Σ = {p1}, and p1 is strictly weaker than p2⇒ a, condition (3) is fulfilled
as well. Furthermore, there are no other arguments that can be in force, soΣ is an extension
of P . The set Σ is however incompatible, since the following argument can be constructed
starting from the conclusions of Σ :
p1
a
→⊥ .
The very point is that, in general, there is no reason to include a premise in the extension,
if it is defeated by a set of arguments that is in force. In the example above, the argument
p2⇒ a is based on a premise strictly stronger than p1, and though including a defeasible
rule, it remains strictly stronger than p1. So it is reasonable that p2⇒ a is preferred to p1,
and p1 is discarded.
4 The three conditions on the order of conclusive force mentioned in Section 2 are satisfied by these relations.
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Note that compatibility of extensions is essential to the correctness of the constructive
part of Vreeswijk’s theory. As extensions are introduced by means of fixed point
definitions, which are not constructive, Vreeswijk develops a specific procedure to find
all the extensions of a generic base set P . This constructive procedure starts from the base
set and works on a sequence of compatible sets of arguments, called argument structures,
by adding one argument at each step. In case the argument system is finite, Vreeswijk
claims that the sequence converges to an extension of P in a finite number of steps. 5
However, the limit of any sequence turns out to be a compatible set, while there are cases
in which no compatible extensions exist (see the example above, in which there is a unique
incompatible extension). Therefore, the claim is false as far as generic extensions are not
guaranteed to be compatible, and the constructive part of the theory is valid only under the
aforementioned assumption on premises.
The above discussion shows that Vreeswijk’s theory essentially depends on a hidden
assumption about the order of arguments stating that the premises in a base set P are
stronger than any defeasible argument. This assumption, however, is not necessary and
might turn out to be counterintuitive in some application contexts, as discussed in the
previous section. Therefore, it might be interesting to remove it.
5. Revising Vreeswijk’s theory
A trivial way to fix Vreeswijk’s theory is simply to formally state the above implicit
assumption. This can be done by adding to the three conditions on the order of arguments
mentioned in Section 2 the following (fourth) condition:
∀p,∀σ If ((p ∈ L)∧ (σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ)) then ¬(p < σ).
This way, any atomic argument, therefore any premise in the base set, is required to be
stronger than any defeasible argument. It can be easily verified that under this assumption
a generic extension of a base set is compatible, and, as a consequence, the constructive part
of the theory turns out to be valid as well.
However, this condition is rather restrictive and seems to possibly exclude interesting
distributions of conclusive force, in contrast with the original desiderata of the theory. In
fact, arguments appear to be rigidly partitioned in two sets, one including premises and
arguments made of strict rules, the other made up of defeasible arguments. Any element of
the former set cannot be strictly weaker than any element of the latter.
An interesting research issue turns out to be, therefore, the extension of Vreeswijk
theory along a different line, without introducing any additional condition on the order
of arguments.
This goal can be achieved by requiring a further condition on the base set, rather than
on the ordering of arguments: a base set could be defined as a finite compatible set P of
atomic arguments such that if a premise p of P belongs to a minimally incompatible set
Σ of arguments based on P , then there is a defeasible argument τ ∈Σ such that τ 6 p.
5 If more than one extension exists, the extension obtained at the end of a particular sequence depends on
arbitrary choices in the selection of arguments to be added at each step.
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This constraint is less restrictive than the fourth assumption introduced above and par-
tially constrains only the strength of arguments incompatible with premises. Considering
a set of defeasible arguments in conflict with a premise, at least one must be weaker than
the premise but all the others can be stronger.
However, this additional condition on the base set, apart from being difficult to check in
practice, seems to be an ad-hoc way to settle the matter. After all, it is still a constraint on
the distribution of conclusive force, and, in a sense, it still compromises one of the essential
features of Vreeswijk’s framework, that is the independence from any specific order among
arguments.
Thus, we aim at adjusting and extending the theory without introducing any additional
constraint on the distribution of conclusive force. As discussed in detail in the following
section, this can be done by revising the definition of defeasible entailment proposed in [21]
(Definition 4.17).
6. Extended abstract argumentation systems theory
In this section we present an extended version of Vreeswijk’s theory according to the
principles discussed above.
6.1. Basic elements
The starting point of our theory is the definition of the set of arguments that are in
force relative to a base set, without taking for granted that premises are strong enough to
be always in force. For this reason, premises belonging to an extension have to emerge
undefeated themselves, in the same way as defeasible arguments. This corresponds to
slightly modifying Vreeswijk’s definition of defeasible entailment relation in the following
way:
Definition 3 (Cf. Definition 4.17 of [21]). Let P be a base set. A relation ≈> between
P and arguments based on P is a defeasible entailment relation if, for every argument σ
based on P , we have P ≈> σ (i.e., σ is in force on the basis of P ) if and only if
(1) σ ∈ P and every set of arguments Σ that is in force on the basis of P is not a
defeater of σ ; or
(2) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have P ≈> σ1, . . . , σn and σ1, . . . , σn→ σ ; or
(3) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have P ≈> σ1, . . . , σn and σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ and
every set of argumentsΣ that is in force on the basis of P is not a defeater of σ .
The set {σ | P ≈> σ } is called the extension generated by ≈> and is denoted by
info≈>(P ).
This definition does not assume any special role for the elements of the base set, so
ensuring that those premises that conflict with stronger defeasible arguments that are in
force are defeated. As a result, a generic extension is guaranteed to be compatible.
Let us consider again the example of Section 4, in which an extension, as defined in [21],
turns out to be incompatible. According to Definition 3, p2 is in force, as there are not
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arguments incompatible with it. The argument p2⇒ a is in force too, as the only argument
that is incompatible with it, namely p1, is strictly weaker than it. As a consequence p1
cannot be in force, because it is defeated by the set {p2⇒ a} that is in force. Thus, the
unique extension of P = {p1,p2} is Σ = {p2,p2⇒ a}, which is compatible.
Compatibility of extensions can be proved by revising Vreeswijk’s proof:
Proposition 4 (Clarifying Proposition 5.11 of Vreeswijk). Let P be a base set, and let Σ
be an extension of P . Then Σ is compatible, closed under subarguments, and its atomic
arguments belong to P .
Proof. Closure under subarguments and the fact that prem(Σ) ⊆ P immediately follow
from Definition 3. To prove compatibility, we refer to Vreeswijk’s proof analyzed in
Section 4. The set Σ is assumed to be incompatible, so it includes an incompatible subset
ΣS made up of atomic arguments and/or of arguments of the form σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ . Let σ
be a 6-least element ofΣS . The set Σ ′S =ΣS \ {σ } is a defeater of σ that is in force. Then
the argument σ , which belongs to P or is of the form σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ , should not be in
force, according respectively to Definition 3(1) and 3(3). However this fact is impossible
because σ ∈Σ . 2
In Vreeswijk’s theory a base set can have different extensions, the choice among them
being arbitrary. Since in our framework premises are not in force per se, there may be a
certain degree of arbitrariness in the choice of surviving premises too. Different extensions
of P can include different sets of premises Pi , the number of these sets being denoted as
deg∗(P ). The number of all the possible extensions is the degree of the base set P , as in
the original framework, and is denoted by deg(P ). Thus, a base set P can be partitioned
into three classes of premises:
(1) The set of those premises that appear in every extension of P , namely Pundef =⋂
i=1,...,deg∗(P ) Pi . This set is made up of premises that emerge undefeated in every
extension.
(2) The set of those premises that appear at least in one extension, but not in every one,
namely Pprov = {⋃i=1,...,deg∗(P ) Pi} \ Pundef.
(3) The set of premises that are discarded independently of any choice made, namely
Pdef = P \ {Pundef ∪Pprov}.
A practical counterpart for the fact that some premises may be excluded from all
extensions may be easily figured out. Consider some information provided by a low
reliability sensor which is defeated by the (defeasible) conclusions derived from the data
coming from more reliable sensors. As far as strength evaluation is considered correct, an
ideal reasoner should neglect the unreliable premise. In fact, discarding data considered
unreliable is an usual practice in many operating contexts.
6.2. Completeness
An argument structure Σ is defined by Vreeswijk as a compatible set of arguments
containing all subarguments of its elements. It can be regarded as an intermediate result,
corresponding to a partial description of the state of the world, obtained at a given step of
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the process of argumentation, where each subargument may be considered as a result of a
precedent stage of the same process.
A new argument τ having all its proper subarguments in Σ can be constructed at each
argumentation step. If τ is compatible with Σ , it can be included in the argument structure
without giving up any of the elements of Σ , otherwise the argument is appendable to Σ
only if it is not defeated by any subset of the argument structure. In this case, one or more
arguments of Σ have to be discarded in order to give place to the new argument. In a
sense, each iteration of this process increases the quantity (if a new compatible argument
is introduced) or the quality (if a stronger argument is included in place of weaker ones) of
the information carried by Σ .
When there are no more appendable arguments outside Σ , the argument structure is
complete, and it can be considered “a complete description of a part of the world”.
In our framework the process of argumentation, starting from a set of premises, may
bring forth an extension which excludes some of them. In fact, we allow an argumentation
step to discard premises: as a result the set of premises may shrink and grow during
the argumentation process. For instance, a premise p which is discarded at a step i due
to a defeater argument η may be re-considered in a subsequent step j if η is in turn
discarded in one of the intermediate steps between i and j . This means that our notion
of appendability has to take into account those premises that do not currently belong to the
argument structure, but are included in the base set from which argumentation has started.
So, appendability to an argument structure has to be defined relative to a base set:
Definition 5 (Cf. Definition 5.4 of [21]). Let Σ be an argument structure, and let P be a
base set. An argument σ is appendable to Σ relative to P if and only if:
(1) the argument σ is already in Σ ; or
(2) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have σ1 ∈Σ, . . . , σn ∈Σ and σ1, . . . , σn→ σ ;
or
(3) the argument σ belongs to P and Σ does not contain defeaters of σ ; or
(4) for some arguments σ1, . . . , σn we have σ1 ∈ Σ, . . . , σn ∈ Σ and σ1, . . . , σn⇒ σ
and Σ does not contain defeaters of σ .
We define completeness in an obvious way:
Definition 6 (Cf. Definition 5.7 of [21]). An argument structure Σ is complete relative to
a base set P if and only if every argument that is appendable to Σ relative to P already is
in Σ .
It should be noticed that the reference to the base set is essential in the above definition.
In fact, our intention is to capture with Definition 6 exactly those arguments that can be
constructed by exploiting completely the base set P . The same definition, deprived of the
reference to the base set, would include any argument structure constructed considering any
proper subset of the initial base set (even the empty set). On the other hand, our definition
does not constrain Σ to be based on P , though in the present paper a complete argument
structure will be always the result of a process of argumentation which refers to the base
set P .
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Vreeswijk claims that a complete argument structure Σ with prem(Σ) = P contains
every argument based on P which is compatible with Σ (Proposition 5.8 of [21]). This
claim gives an insight into the notion of completeness, as it says that “complete argument
structures are either for or against every argument that can be generated from the base set”.
However, in our framework we do not require this property.
To illustrate this aspect, let us consider the abstract argumentation system A with
language
L= {p,q, r, a} ∪ {⊥}
with rules
R = {p⇒ q, q⇒ r, r⇒ a} ∪ {p, r→⊥},
and with the ⇒-count order on arguments, i.e., σ 6 τ if and only if the number of
defeasible arrows in σ is less or equal than the number of defeasible arrows in τ . This
order makes any atomic argument stronger than any defeasible argument, and it can be
easily shown that in this case our framework turns out to be equivalent to Vreeswijk’s one.
The set
Σ = {p,p⇒ q}
is an argument structure. Let us prove that it is complete relative to P = {p}, i.e., that
any argument based on P outside Σ is not appendable to Σ . The argument p⇒ q ⇒ r
is defeated by the set {p}, so according to Definition 5 it is not appendable to Σ .
As a consequence, also the argument p ⇒ q ⇒ r ⇒ a is not appendable to Σ (see
Definition 5(4)). Thus Σ is complete with respect to P , but it fails to include an argument
based on P which is compatible with it, namely p⇒ q⇒ r⇒ a.
The point is that if an argument has a sub-argument that is defeated by a subset of
a complete argument structure Σ , then it is not reasonable to include it in Σ . In fact
if the argumentation process has discarded an argument τ , then any argument σ which
has τ as sub-argument cannot be in force (of course, the conclusion of σ might be
derived in another way). So the meaning of “complete description of a state of the world”
which is ascribed to a complete argument structure does not entail that it includes every
compatible argument based on the base set. It entails just its closure with respect to strict
argumentation and defeasible argumentation (limited to undefeated arguments), but this is
a direct consequence of the definition of completeness.
In Vreeswijk’s framework, complete argument structures are the corner-stone of the
constructive part of the theory. As it will be shown in the next section, each one of them
is the limit of a sequence of argument structures which can be built by adding at each step
one appendable argument to the preceding element.
Actually, we are interested in finding the sets of arguments that are in force relative to a
base set, namely the extensions of that base set. The following proposition is essential to
prove that the constructive procedure is correct, as it can find only extensions:
Proposition 7 (Cf. Proposition 5.10 of [21]). Let P be a base set, and let Σ be an
argument structure which is complete relative to P , such that prem(Σ)⊆ P . ThenΣ is an
extension of P , i.e., there is a defeasible entailment relation≈> such thatΣ = info≈>(P ).
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Proof. The proof is a slight modification of that relevant to Proposition 5.10 of [21], taking
into account that if a premise belongs to an extension (it is appendable to an argument
structure), then the extension (the argument structure) does not contain defeaters of it. 2
In our framework, compatibility of extensions allows us to prove that they are complete
argument structures.
Proposition 8 (Cf. Proposition 5.11 of [21]). Let P be a base set, and let Σ be an
extension of P , i.e., Σ = info≈>(P ). Then Σ is an argument structure that is complete
relative to P and prem(Σ)⊆ P .
Proof. According to Proposition 4, Σ is an argument structure whose premises belong to
P . It remains to be proved thatΣ is complete relative to P , namely that if an argument σ is
appendable to Σ relative to P , then σ is already in Σ . The argument σ satisfies one of the
clauses of Definition 5. If it satisfies the first condition, then it is already in Σ . Otherwise
σ satisfies conditions (2), (3), or (4) and, as every subset of Σ is a set of arguments that
is in force, it satisfies respectively condition (2), (1), or (3) of Definition 3. Thus, σ is in
force, namely it belongs to Σ . 2
6.3. Construction of extensions
We have shown in the previous section that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between extensions of a generic base set and complete argument structures relative to
the same base set. This makes possible to parallel and extend in our framework the
constructive procedure proposed by Vreeswijk, which obtains the extensions as limits of
proper sequences of argument structures. Each term Σn of such a sequence is obtained
by adding to the previous term Σn−1 at most one argument which is directly constructed
from Σn−1, i.e., from the conclusions of Σn−1 by applying at most one rule of inference.
The main difference between Vreeswijk’s framework and ours is that a premise can be
discarded if a stronger conflicting argument is introduced, and, conversely, a premise not
included in Σn−1 can be added if it defeats weaker arguments or is compatible with Σn.
As a consequence, at every argumentation step the elements of the base set are candidates
for inclusion:
Definition 9 (Cf. Definition 6.1 of [21]). Let Σ be an argument structure, and let P be a
base set. An argument is directly constructed from Σ relative to P if the argument belongs
to P or all its proper subarguments are in Σ . An argument structure is directly constructed
from Σ relative to P if all its members are directly constructed from Σ relative to P .
Definition 10 (Cf. Definition 6.2 of [21]). An elementary argumentation step relative to P
fromΣ1 to Σ2 is a pair of argument structuresΣ1, Σ2 such that Σ2 is directly constructed
from Σ1 relative to P , and Σ2 \Σ1 consists of at most one element.
In [21] the first element of any argumentation sequence is required to be the entire
base set. This means that premises are assigned a priority in the order of inclusion in the
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sequence: this may prevent arguments conflicting with premises and having equal strength
to enter in the sequence, just because they are considered later and hence cannot defeat
an argument (actually a premise) already included. 6 In order to avoid this preferential
treatment reserved to premises, we define an argumentation sequence as starting from the
empty set: this modification increases the degree of freedom in its construction and extends
the set of the argumentation sequences that can be built relative to a given set of premises.
As it will be shown below, this is essential for the procedure being capable of constructing
all the extensions of a given base set.
Definition 11 (Cf. Definition 6.3 of [21]). An argumentation sequence relative to a base
set P (
∑P
n )
∞
n=1 is a collection of argument structures {
∑
n}∞n=1 such that
(1) Σ1 = ∅; and
(2) for every n> 1, the pair Σn, Σn+1 is an elementary argumentation step relative to
P .
It can be easily shown that every term of an argumentation sequence relative to a base
set P is a finite argument structure based on P .
Our notion of limit is the same as Vreeswijk’s one, namely it is the set of the arguments
that are definitely included in every term of the sequence after a given step:
Definition 12 (Cf. Definition 6.5 of [21]). Let (∑Pn )∞n=1 be an argumentation sequence
relative to P . Its limit limn Σn is defined as follows: an argument is in limn Σn if it is in all
but a finite number of terms of (
∑P
n )
∞
n=1.
The limit of an argumentation sequence turns out to be an argument structure, as it can
be shown following the proof provided by Vreeswijk:
Proposition 13 (Cf. Proposition 6.6 of [21]). Let (∑Pn )∞n=1 be an argumentation sequence
relative to P . Then limn Σn is an argument structure based on P .
For the same reasons why in Section 6.2 we have defined appendability and complete-
ness of argument structures referring to the base set, we have also to define completeness of
an argumentation sequence as relative to the basic set of premises. Complete argumentation
sequences relative to a base set turn out to converge to its extensions.
Definition 14 (Cf. Definition 6.7 of [21]). An argumentation sequence relative to P is
complete if its limit is complete relative to P .
Proposition 15 (Cf. Proposition 6.8 of [21]). Let (∑Pn )∞n=1 be a complete argumentation
sequence relative to P . Then limn Σn is an extension of P .
Proof. Proposition 13 ensures that limn Σn is an argument structure Σ such that
prem(Σ) ⊆ P . By Definition 14 we have that the limit is also complete relative to P ,
so, according to Proposition 7, it is an extension of P . 2
6 In case of collective defeat [16] premises are “saved” in spite of defeasible arguments.
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According to the above proposition, the task of constructing an extension of a base set
P can be accomplished by finding a complete argumentation sequence relative to P . As
in [21], in the case of a finite argumentation system there is a particular class of elementary
argumentation steps, namely D-successors, whose repeated application ensures that the
obtained sequence is complete:
Definition 16 ((D-successor) cf. Definition 6.9 of [21]). Let Σ be an argument structure,
and let σ be an argument that is appendable to Σ relative to P . Let {Σi | i ∈ I } be the
collection of subsets of Σ that are minimally incompatible with σ , and let {σi | i ∈ I } be a
set of 6-least elements for this family. Then 7
Σ
P+ σ def= Σ \ sup(σi | i ∈ I) ∪ {σ }
is a D-successor of Σ relative to P .
The results of the constructive part of Vreeswijk’s theory are maintained in our
framework, since the relevant proofs are practically the same and can be obtained simply
by substituting our definitions to the original ones and by taking into account that premises
are subjected to the same constraints as defeasible arguments. The main results are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 17 (Cf. Propositions 6.13 and 6.16 of [21]). Let P be a base set. Let {∑n}∞n=1
be a sequence of sets of arguments, such thatΣ1 = ∅, and, for every n> 1, the set Σn+1 is
a D-successor ofΣn relative to P . Then {∑n}∞n=1 is an argumentation sequence (∑Pn )∞n=1
relative to P . Moreover, limn Σn is finite if and only if, for some n > 1, the argument
structure Σn is complete relative to P .
If there is only a finite set of enabled arguments, i.e., the argumentation system is finite,
the limit of any argumentation sequence is obviously finite as well. As a consequence,
by constructing an argumentation sequence relative to a given base set P made up of D-
successors an extension of P is produced:
Proposition 18 (Cf. Proposition 7.4 of [21]). Let A be a finite argumentation system, let
P be a base set and let (
∑P
n )
∞
n=1 be an argumentation sequence relative to P such that,for every n> 1, the argument structure Σn+1 is a D-successor of Σn relative to P . Then
limn Σnis an extension of P .
While the above proposition ensures that the constructive procedure is correct, we show
that it is also complete:
Proposition 19. Let A be a finite argumentation system, let P be a base set and let Σ be
an extension of P . Then it is possible to construct an argumentation sequence relative to
P which converges to Σ after a finite number of steps.
7 Given an argument σ , sup (σ ) indicates the set of arguments that have σ as a sub-argument.
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Proof. According to Proposition 8, Σ is a complete argument structure relative to P .
Let P ′ = P ∩Σ . A suitable argumentation sequence can be constructed as follows: first
the elements of P ′ are appended to the empty set Σ1, then all the other arguments of Σ
are directly constructed in turn from the current term of the sequence and appended. As
Σ is compatible, its arguments are appended without giving up any previously included
argument, so after a finite number of steps, say k, Σk =Σ . At this point there are no other
appendable arguments, because of the completeness of Σ , and we are done. 2
Notice that the relatively simple proof provided above has been enabled by the selection
of the set P ′ as starting point of the argumentation process. Actually, if Σ1 was required
to be P and P ′ ⊆ P , any argument in collective defeat with some premises would be
prevented to enter in the sequence, and some extensions might not be reachable.
7. Comparison with related work
The present work provides a significant extension to the abstract argumentation systems
theory presented in [21]. Therefore, in a technical sense, the only relevant work is
Vreeswijk’s theory itself, whose relationships with our proposal have been presented and
discussed all along in the paper.
From a conceptual point of view, however, the proposed extension involves an important
difference in the role ascribed to premises, which deserves a specific discussion.
The growing literature about argumentation can be roughly partitioned into three main
classes:
(1) proposals of specific argumentation systems, which deal with the definition of
argument representation and with the structure of the argumentation process,
including the association of a strength to arguments;
(2) Vreeswijk’s abstract theory, which provides a general argumentation framework
independent of the mechanism used for ascribing strength to arguments;
(3) even more abstract works, that focus on a general characterization of specific aspects
of argumentation activity (e.g., Dung’s work on argument acceptability [3], or the
characterization of cautiousness in [13], or the argumentation theoretic approach to
default reasoning in [1]).
Our discussion concerns mainly the works belonging to the first two classes, since the
role ascribed to premises is related both to the definition of argument internal structure and
to the actual method of argumentation adopted, as discussed below.
As far as the definition of argument internal structure is concerned, different positions
can be found about the role of premises. On the one hand they can be regarded as special
cases of arguments and therefore share all argument properties, such as strength. This is
the standpoint of [21], that we fully share: premises are selected statements that represent
the necessary starting point of the argumentation process (and therefore should not be seen
as external to it). Actually the procedure of premise selection is outside the argumentation
model, however, in any reasoning context, there is a reason why a given fact is considered
to be a premise in a given situation. Such reason, whatever it is, represents an implicit
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(extra-theory) support for the premise being there and therefore a premise can be regarded
as a special self-contained argument, actually, as the conclusion of an implicit argument.
In [10] a similar point of view is adopted: premises are a selected subset of the language
and are considered as arguments in all respects, however they are seen as special inference
rules rather than being introduced as an individual notion.
In the works by Krause and coauthors [4,5,9] arguments are defined (with minor
variations) as pairs of a formula and a set of labels, which synthesize the reasoning path
from which the formula can be derived (possibly a confidence measure is additionally
ascribed to each argument). Also in this context premises are seen as special arguments,
where the label associated to each premise simply denotes a fact included in a database
from which reasoning starts.
In Pollock’s theory [14–17] the basic element is the notion of reason, namely an
ordered pair 〈Γ,p〉 where Γ is the set of premises of the reason and p is the conclusion.
Arguments are then constructed by combining reasons. Premises alone can be seen as
special arguments (see the notion of Rule F in [14]).
Finally, in [19] the initial knowledge of a reasoner is called context and includes a set of
sentences in the considered language and a set of defeasible rules. An argument for a given
conclusion h in a given context K is then defined as a set T of defeasible rules such that
K ∪ T entails h under some conditions. Clearly in this approach the notion of premise is
totally distinct from that of argument. It is our opinion that such a neat distinction is rather
disadvantageous: in particular it has an important consequence also on the definition of
argumentation activity, as it will be discussed in the following. Actually also Vreeswijk in
a previous work [20] proposed a formalization where the notion of premise was completely
distinct from the one of argument (and included the rules too), but turned to a different (and,
in our opinion, preferable) conceptual schema in the subsequent evolution of his theory.
Let us now consider the process of argumentation and in particular the notion of defeat
among arguments. The main difference between Vreeswijk’s proposal and ours is the fact
that premises are regarded as defeasible themselves, and therefore are not guaranteed to
be included in all the extensions derived from a base set. The main motivations for this
choice have been discussed in Section 3: in particular, if premises include facts derived
from sensorial data, it seems natural to admit the possibility of pruning some of them when
they are not particularly reliable and contrast with other defeasible, but more reliable,
conclusions. Since defeat is a relation defined on arguments, such kind of pruning is
simply prevented in the formalisms where premises are not arguments. For instance, in [19]
it is explicitly stated that the context knowledge (namely the premises) “represents the
indefeasible part” of an individual’s knowledge. In our view, ascribing indefeasibility to
premises is an unnecessary limitation that restricts the practical situations that can be
modeled by the theory. In his 1991 work, Vreeswijk [20] provides a conceptual background
for the arguments vs. premises separation: he distinguishes between belief revision, i.e.,
reasoning with defeasible information (but with certain deduction), and argument revision,
i.e., reasoning with defeasible knowledge. While this distinction can be conceptually
useful, it has to be noticed that, in a sense, it refers to two extreme cases: in fact, in
many practical contexts reasoning activity has to deal with both defeasible information
and defeasible knowledge.
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For this reason, the ability to capture both aspects of defeasible reasoning activity is
advantageous from a twofold perspective:
• on the theoretical side, it achieves the unification of two theories which have often
been regarded as distinct but that pertain to strictly related problems and share many
conceptual features;
• on the practical side, it brings the argumentation model nearer to applicability in
realistic contexts.
Regarding premises as arguments is a necessary condition for this ability to be obtained,
as explained above. Another condition is then required: premises have to be regarded as
defeasible.
As a matter of fact, it seems that such opportunity, though available in several
argumentation theories, has not received all the attention it deserves. For instance, none
of the numerous and articulated examples of defeat presented in [16,17] involves the
premises. In particular, in [15] premises are ascribed an infinite positive strength.
Also other works where the status of the premises as arguments is explicit fail to enter the
question of the defeasibility of premises. In the theory developed in [4,5,9] defeasibility of
the premises does not seem to be excluded a priori. In particular, five acceptability classes
are defined that can be directly applied also to premises: however it does not seem that
this option has been explicitly considered. Similarly, the notion of confidence measure
is applied to premises but is then used in order to carry out a selection among different
argument conclusions, without affecting the premises themselves.
In [10] the defeasibility of the premises is explicitly excluded, since it is stated that all the
base facts (which are regarded as special rules) are present by definition in any argument
structure built from the set of rules where they are included. The work of Vreeswijk [21],
though ascribing a different conceptual status to base facts, inherits this approach and
includes by definition all the premises in the argument structures based on them. This is
an unnecessary assumption (and a limitation as well), as it is demonstrated by the fact that
Vreeswijk himself does not completely respect it in the constructive part of his proposal. In
fact, the algorithm defined in Section 6.3 of [21] is already able to discard premises, but this
capability does not seem to have been noticed and is prevented by the initial assumption on
premises. Our proposal overcomes this limitation and, in a sense, brings the theory nearer
to the full exploitation of its remarkable potential.
Since our approach is strictly based on [21], it has to be noticed that it also inherits a
basic limitation, since it does not accommodate undercutting defeat. Pollock [14] points
out that there are two possible kinds of defeaters for an argument using a defeasible rule,
namely rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters. While a rebutting defeater attacks
the argument by denying its conclusion, an undercutting defeater attacks the connection
between the set of premises and the conclusion of a defeasible rule used by the argument.
For instance, the fact that an object looks red is a defeasible reason to believe that
the object is red, while the presence of red light is an undercutting defeater for any
argument using this reason. It should be noticed that an undercutting defeater does not
attack the conclusion of the defeated argument nor the general validity of the involved
defeasible rule: in the example, the presence of red light is compatible with the object
being red. As in Vreeswijk’s formalism, in our approach the notion of defeat is built on the
notion of incompatibility, therefore undercutting defeaters are not recognized and defeat
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arises only from contradictions. As to our knowledge, the main (and unique) approach
seriously dealing with undercutting defeaters is due to Pollock (see [18]), while most of
the other literature proposals only rely on rebutting defeat. The present paper mainly aims
at demonstrating the possibility of combining defeasible reasoning and belief revision in
the context of abstract argumentation systems theory, which is able to encompass many
existing approaches. The inclusion of undercutting defeaters in a revised and further
extended theory is left as a topic for future work.
In summary, we hope that our contribution to the development of abstract argumentation
systems theory, besides fixing some technical problems, provides further light on the strict
relationships between the areas of belief revision and defeasible reasoning and shows the
suitability of arguments as a general unifying model for the activity of intelligent reasoning
in presence of various kinds of uncertainty.
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